Abstract-Providing a suitable key establishment protocol in wireless sensor networks is challenging due to all the characteristics of these networks, such as limitations of power, computation capability and storage resources. This paper presents a novel key agreement protocol for wireless sensor networks. By applying the ID-based technique, a sensor node and a security manager can achieve key exchange and fast authentication. In this protocol the expensive operations are removed from sensor node side and a sensor node needs not to transmit its implicit certificate, so it reduces the energy cost of sensor nodes. We prove the security of our protocol in the random oracle model. Index Terms-key agreement, wireless sensor network, bilinear map, modified bilinear inverse Diffe-Hellman problem
INTRODUCTION
Recent advancement in wireless communications and electronics has enabled the development of low-cost sensor networks [1] . A sensor network is composed of a large number of sensor nodes that are small in size and have limited wireless communication capabilities with short coverage distance. Sensor networks can be used for different types of application areas such as military tracking, environmental monitoring, health care, traffic control and home automation.
Wireless sensor networks are subject to different types of security threats and attacks such as impersonation, eavesdropping, data modification and physical capture of a node etc. Therefore security measures should be adopted to protect the wireless communications. A solid key management frame work is one of the most crucial technologies to achieving secure infrastructure in wireless sensor networks. However, the conventional protocols maybe impractical for sensor networks due to all the characteristics of these networks, such as limitations of power, computation capability and storage resources.
In the wireless sensor networks, the sensor nodes rely on battery power and once the batteries are flat, it is almost impossible to replace the batteries on sensor nodes that are place in hostile environment such as enemy territory [2] . Therefore there is a need to employ energy-efficient key agreement protocol in order to prolong the battery life.
In recent years, symmetric-key based key agreement protocols have gained popularity due to the small computation overhead. A promising solution for the establishment of symmetric keys in wireless sensor networks applications is to use key predistribution protocols, studied in various papers [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . Although symmetric mechanisms achieve low computation overhead when compared with public key operations, the key management for symmetric key based protocols is complicated, and is always subject to attack by adversaries. Therefore many public-key based protocols were proposed [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] for wireless senor networks which give more flexibility and scalability.
In this paper, we propose an efficient ID-based protocol for key agreement in wireless sensor networks. Since the proposed protocol remove expensive operations from a sensor node side and eliminates the communication overhead of transmitting public-key certificates, it scales down the energy cost of sensor nodes. Moreover we prove the security of our protocol in the random oracle model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section Ⅱ, describes the related works. Some preliminaries are reviewing in section Ⅲ. Section IV presents our key agreement protocol. In section V, the security of the proposed protocol is discussed. We discuss the performance in section VI, and conclude the paper in 
II. RELATED WORKS
The simplest method of key distribution is to embed a single key in the memory of all nodes before nodes are deployed. The main drawback of this protocol is that the whole network will be compromised if a single node is captured. Another extreme method is that each node in a network of n nodes shares a unique pairwise key with every other node in the network before deployment. These protocols require memory for n-1 keys materials for each sensor node. So these methods are unsuitable for wireless sensor networks. Eschenauer and Gligor originally proposed a random key pre-distribution protocol [3] for pair-wise key establishment in which a key pool is randomly selected from the key space and a key ring, a randomly selected subset form the key pool, is stored in each node before deployment. A common key in two key rings of a pair of neighbor nodes is used as their pair-wise key. Since key rings contain keys randomly picked from the same key pool, more than a pair of nodes may use the same common key to secure their communications. Based on this protocol, Chan et al. proposed a q-composite random key pre-distribution protocol [4] , which increases the security of key setup such that an attacker has to compromise many more nodes to achieve a high probability of compromising communication. The difference between the q-composite scheme and the E-G scheme is that q predistributed keys are required between two nodes to establish a pair-wire key. Following their works, some other protocols were proposed [5, 6, 7] . However the main issue in the random key predistribution approach is that node-to-node mutual authentication is not allowed.
All the protocols discussed above are based on symmetric key cryptography. Compared with asymmetric key cryptography, symmetric mechanisms achieve low computation overhead, but they require significant communication overhead or a large amount of memory for each sensor node. Therefore many protocols which based on asymmetric key cryptography were proposed. Bresson et al. proposed a certificate based authenticated group key agreement protocol [8] for low-power mobile devices. But in 2005, J. Nam et al. point out that their protocol was vulnerable to the parallel session attack [16] . Huang et al. [9] proposed two efficient key establishment protocols for wireless sensor networks where a sensor node and a security manager can achieve key exchange and fast mutual authentication by using ECC cryptosystems. However these protocols require the transmission of public-key certificates which increase the communication overhead. These protocols mentioned above are all based on PKIs.
In order to reduce the communication cost, some ID-based protocols for wireless sensor networks have been proposed where a sensor node needs not transmit its implicit certificate. N. McCullagh et al. [10] proposed a two-part identity-based authenticated key agreement. In this protocol, the low-power mobile devices need to perform expensive pairing operations, so it is not suitable to wireless sensor networks. Zhang Y. et al. proposed three protocols for wireless senor networks [11, 12, 13] . Those protocols offer low communication overhead and low memory requirement by eliminating the public key certificate. But in those protocols sensor nodes should still perform expensive computation such as Weil/Tate pairing and Map-To-Point operation. Recently, Y.H. Kim et al. [14] proposed an energy-efficient key establishment protocol which eliminates the communication cost required to transmit public key certificates and needs not perform the Weil/Tate pairing and Map-To-Point operation. However this protocol still needs a certain computational overhead.
III. PRELIMINARIES

A. Bilinear Map
In this section, we review bilinear maps and some assumptions related to our protocol. Let be a cyclic additive group of prime order and be a cyclic multiplicative group of same order . We assume that the discrete logarithm problems (DLP) in both and are intractable. We call an admissible bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties: 
The BDH, BIDH and mBIDH problems are polynomial time equivalent [17] . We assume that above three problems are intractable. That is, there is no polynomial time algorithm solving these problems with non-negligible probability.
IV. ID-BASED KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a novel ID-based key agreement protocol ( ) which comprises two phases: system initialization phase and session key establishment phase. The procedure is described in details as follows:
Before network deployment, a trusted key generation center (KGC) performs the following operations:
Step − KGC constructs two groups G 1 , G2 , and a map e as described above . It also chooses four  cryptographic  hash  functions  ,  ,  , where is the bit length of a session key and is a secret parameter. Then KGC computes
= where P is a generator of G 1 . 1 2:
Step − KGC chooses a random integer * q s Z ∈ as the network master secret and computes .
Step − KGC sets a unique ID u for each node u as its identification information where
Step − For each node u with ID u , KGC calculates and . Next, node u is preloaded with its ID 
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2. Session key establishment phase. When sensor node u and security manager want to establish a session key, they performs the following steps as show in Fig.1 .
Step − Security manager broadcast its public key Step − Upon receiving the information { , , security manager computes 
as the shared session key with , otherwise, it deletes the receiving information.
v Theorem1. The equality will be hold, if the sensor node and the security manager perform the protocol correctly.
( , )
The private key of sensor node is hide in the , so security manager can verify that whether the information is compute from correct equation according to the equality . Assume that uses correct information to compute and , then the verification works as follow:
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We can easily show that if the equality holds, the security manager can verify the received information comes from the sensor node . Also if the equality
holds, the sensor node believes that the security manager has the knowledge of its private key . 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Model
The model is used to formalize the protocol and the adversary's capabilities [18] . Firstly, we define protocol participants, accepting, terminating, session , partner , oracle queries below. 
ID
Z Z =
If the equality holds, 3 ( )
If the equality holds, 
U query: C query models the attacks to a client to compromise the long-lived key. This query will let use deal with Half Forward Secrecy [19] . The adversary A sends query to a sensor node (except manager node), and gets back its long-lived key. But can not get other information of that sensor node. 
orrupt( )
, , , , , ,
and send the public system parameters to .
Subsequently, starts running as a subroutine and answers the oracle queries made by as explained below. Obviously the
Furthermore, the probability that correctly guesses the moment at which A breaks the AKE security of protocol is the probability that correctly guesses the values and . Denote it by From above the advantage that break the B k mBIDH − problem is equal to the product of ①the advantage that breaks the AKE security of , ② the probability that correctly guesses the moment at which breaks the AKE security, ③ the probability that correctly chooses among the possible query. In protocol , every sensor node needs to storage two parts information. One part is sensor node's identification information, key pair and system parameters. Another part is all pair-wise keys which are shared with other nodes. In wireless sensor networks, the ideal memory overhead for the sensor node is that the sensor node only storages the pair-wise keys shared with its neighbor nodes [20] . Compared with ideal memory overhead, our proposed protocol only adds memory requirements of identification information, key pair and system parameters. Since this memory overhead is very small when compared to the memory requirements of pair-wise keys. So the memory overhead of our protocol is in reason.
P
Computation overhead
In the proposed protocol, the main cost of computation is from session key establishment and node authentication which comprises once elliptic curve scalar multiplication of a random point, once elliptic curve scalar multiplication of a fixed point and once small modular exponentiation. In our protocol, once a session key has been established between a sensor node and security manager, it will be used to achieve security communication. Therefore during the execution of the protocol all computations mentioned above only perform once. So the sensor node only spends moderate computation cost.
3. Communication overhead During the execution of the proposed protocol, a total of three messages are exchanged, one for broadcast public key of security manager, two for pair-wise key establishment and mutual authentication. scales down the number of elliptic curve scalar multiplication of a random point and the number of elliptic curve scalar multiplication of a fixed point under the same communication complexity. So our proposed protocol offers low energy consumption.
P
Energy Consumption Results
Our computational energy consumption cost is based on the SA-1110 "Strong ARM" microprocessor and the communication cost is based on the power consumption of the radio transceiver module used on the Rockwell Scientific WINS sensor nodes. Fig. 2 shows the energy consumption by each of the three protocols, namely MSR-Hybird, Yong and our proposed protocol . From  Fig.2 , we can see that our proposed protocol is the most efficient protocol as compared with other two protocols. The MSR-Hybird protocol consumes the most amount of energy due to the requiring of public-key certificates transmission. For the Yong protocol, the high energy consumption is due to the computational overhead. Fig.2 also shows that our proposed protocol is more energy efficient than Yong because in our proposed protocol a senor node needs not transmit its public-key certificates and also needs not perform the expensive operation. In the wireless sensor networks, all nodes are low-power energy constrained devices. Therefore key agreement protocols designed for such networks have to be energy efficient. In this paper, we propose an efficient authenticated ID-based protocol for key agreement in wireless sensor networks where the sensor node and the security manager can achieve key exchange and mutual authentication by using identification information. Since the proposed protocol removes expensive operations from a sensor node side and eliminates the communication overhead of transmitting public-key certificates, it scales down the energy cost of sensor nodes. The energy consumption costs analysis indicates that our proposed protocol is the most energy efficient protocol as compared with MSR-Hybird and Yong protocols for wireless sensor networks. Moreover we prove the security of our protocol in the random oracle model.
